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 ABSTRACT  
Concerns about the credibility of sustainability reports can be mitigated through assurance. 
Although audit committee remit encompasses monitoring of sustainability issues, there are 
potential complementary and substitution between governance mechanisms. This paper 
explores the relationship between audit committees and sustainability reporting assurance 
using resource dependency theory. We find audit committee characteristics have an impact, 
additional to that of the board of directors and the existence of sustainability committees, on 
voluntary sustainability assurance. Our results also show that audit committee independence 
is associated with use of a Big 4 audit firm for sustainability reporting assurance. A negative 
association between sustainability committees and assurance however indicates assurance 
could be a burden for small firms. Overall, the findings suggest audit committees add 
credibility and help improve sustainability reporting through their independence, expertise, 
and oversight. 
 
Keywords: assurance; audit committees; corporate governance; sustainability, resource 
dependency theory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Boards of directors and management are under pressure from stakeholders to demonstrate 
their companies are operating in a sustainable way and to incorporate sustainable business 
practices and sustainable development into their corporate identity (Amran et al., 2014; Dutta 
et al., 2012; Jizi, 2017).  Commitment to sustainable development and sustainability reporting, 
which affects corporate transparency and accountability, is thus high on the corporate agenda. 
In developing sustainability strategies companies need to choose from a range of alternatives 
and allocate resources, such as human capital and reputation, to different types of 
sustainability initiatives to develop competitive advantages (Yadav et al., 2016; Arena et al., 
2018). As companies become cognizant of the reputational and financial risk associated with 
sustainability issues (Darnall et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009a; 2009b; De Villiers et al., 2011; 
Moroney et al., 2012; GRI, 2013; KPMG, 2014; Birkey et al., 2016) they are making oversight of 
sustainability practices and reporting a key priority and widening the remit of those charged 
with corporate governance1 to address stakeholder expectations. To alleviate concerns and 
add credibility to sustainability reports, companies may voluntarily adopt sustainability 
reporting assurance (hereafter SRA).2 
Audit committees, which are now almost universal feature of corporate governance, 
are expected to exercise greater oversight over both financial and non-financial information 
in assessing company performance (ICAA, 2014; EY, 2014; Trotman and Trotman, 2015). Audit 
committees are increasingly concerned about not misleading stakeholders and ensuring the 
quality and reliability of both financial and non-financial information released to the market.3 
                                                          
1 This typically means the boards of directors but, depending on country specific regulatory context, can also 
include subcommittees, such as audit committees and sustainability committees. 
2 SRA has similarities with the statutory financial audit. Cohen and Simnett (2015: 66) note: “The main assurance 
standard used for assuring CSR reports, ISAE3000 (IAASB, 2013), parallels the financial statement audit approach, 
and involves (1) gaining and understanding of the entity, (2) undertaking a risk assessment (at the assertion level 
if appropriate), and then (3) responding to assessed risks by employing the most efficient and effective combination 
of tests of control and substantive testing”. 
3 See for example Carcello et al. (2011); Zaman et al. (2011); Salleh and Stewart (2012); and FRC (2015). 
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Indeed, Trotman and Trotman (2015) find audit committees are concerned about 
sustainability reporting and its accuracy and increasingly monitor the reporting process. 
Similarly, FERMA (2014) reports that sustainability is a key subject for coordination between 
management, the ‘support functions’ and the board and its audit committee as well as the 
external stakeholders of the business. 
The existence of boards of directors, audit committees and sustainability committees 
in companies raises interesting questions. Do audit committees have an incremental 
contribution in enhancing the credibility of sustainability reports when a company has boards 
with independent directors and a board level sustainability committee? Additionally, does 
the incremental contribution of audit committees vary between large versus small companies? 
Our paper addresses these two questions recognising that governance structures may 
complement or substitute for each other and that here is relatively little research on these 
relations (Armstrong et al., 2010; Cohen and Simnett, 2015; Farooq and de Villiers, 2017.)   
This paper provides evidence on the contribution of audit committees, incremental to 
that of the boards of directors and the existence of sustainability committees, on SRA and 
contributes to the literature in a few ways. First, while it is generally recognised that corporate 
governance can affect assurance, there is a paucity of research on audit committees and SRA. 
For example, although Peters and Romi (2015) examine the role of governance mechanisms 
on the likelihood of SRA in the US, they control for only one dimension of audit committees, 
i.e. audit committee size, and do not explore the effect of audit committee attributes on SRA 
nor discuss the incremental contribution of audit committees on SRA, additional to that of the 
board of directors and sustainability committees.  Amran et al. (2014) focus on one corporate 
governance mechanism, i.e. the role of the board of directors, on sustainability reporting 
quality4 and suggest that future research needs to examine the role of audit committees in this 
                                                          
4 Amran et al. (2014) focus on the reliability and validity of sustainability reports as two aspects of the quality and 
suggest that remaining aspects such as credibility and comprehensiveness need to be investigated. 
4 
 
respect. Relating to their call, our paper focuses on audit committee contribution in enhancing 
the credibility of sustainability reports through voluntary assurance. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first UK paper to focus on the incremental role of audit committees on 
SRA when a company has boards with independent directors and a board level sustainability 
committee, and provide evidence on the association between audit committees and SRA. 
Second, most studies on SRA are either based on cross-country or US data. Cross-
country studies tend to cover a sample period and include years during which sustainability 
reporting is at an evolutionary stage of development (e.g. Simnett et al., 2009a; Perego and 
Kolk, 2012; Green and Zhou, 2013; Clarkson et al., 2015a; 2015b). Institutional differences 
however can affect sustainability reporting (Young and Marais, 2012; Birkey et al., 2016).5 For 
instance, the litigious nature of the US environment means US companies are likely to be 
exposed to greater litigation risk and uncertainties about the benefits of SRA. Our paper 
extends the literature and provides recent evidence from the less litigious environment of the 
UK on the association between audit committees and SRA. In the UK the Companies Act 
requires boards of directors to have regard to community and environmental issues when 
considering their duty to promote success of the company and directors’ assessment of risk is 
expected to include health, safety and environmental reputation and business probity issues. 
Unlike statutory audit of financial statements in the UK, the statutory auditor is not required 
to verify environmental information (DEFRA, 2013). Also, the UK adopts a non-mandatory 
approach to corporate governance and there is a greater history of audit committees and their 
expected role has over time expanded beyond a focus on the financial aspects of corporate 
governance to oversight of risk and non-financial reporting. Third, our paper adds to 
qualitative studies by providing evidence on the association between audit committees and 
                                                          
5 The adoption of SRA over a period, especially in cross-country studies, is subject to institutional and regulatory 
settings. This also applies to audit committees – they have evolved over time and their functioning and impact is 
subject to organizational as well as institutional settings. See for example Beasley (1996); Collier and Zaman (2005); 
Turley and Zaman (2007); Cohen et al. (2010); Salleh and Stewart (2012); Beattie et al. (2014).  
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SRA. It complements studies such as O’Dwyer’s (2011) examination of the construction of 
sustainability assurance based on interviews with practitioners from two Big Four audit firms 
and Trotman and Trotman’s (2015) study based on interviews with audit committee members, 
senior accountants and internal auditors in Australia on the role of internal auditors on 
sustainability reporting.  
Overall, we provide evidence on the association between audit committees and SRA. 
Consistent with calls for audit committees to take on a wider remit, we find audit committees 
have a positive and significant association with SRA. This effect is incremental to that of the 
boards of directors and the existence of sustainability committees. Audit committee 
contribution on SRA holds in large and small firms subsamples and after controlling for 
industry effects. The existence of sustainability committees, however, has a negative impact 
on SRA in small firms. The results suggest that rather than substituting for corporate 
governance mechanisms audit committees perform a complementary role and their 
monitoring extends beyond financial reporting to oversight of sustainability issues.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature, provides the theoretical framework, and outlines our hypothesis. Section 3 sets out 
the research study in terms of sample, data and model. In section 4 we report the empirical 
results and in section 5 we provide a summary and draw conclusions.   
 
2. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Credibility of sustainability reports 
To alleviate stakeholder and regulatory concerns companies are increasingly reporting on 
sustainability issues and having the reports voluntarily assured. Research on the credibility 
of sustainability reports is at a nascent stage.6 Perego and Kolk (2012) provide descriptive 
                                                          
6 The limited but evolving research relating to SRA may be categorised into: cross-country studies focused on global 
developments and adoption, including standard setting and policy formulation (Simnett et al., 2009a; Mock et al., 
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evidence on patterns of SRA adoption across countries by multinational companies during 
1999-2008 and find significant variation in adoption. This is not surprising given the 
evolutionary nature of sustainability reporting and variation in country level institutional 
pressures for their adoption. In contrast to Perego and Kolk’s (2012) descriptive study, Simnett 
et al. (2009a) examine firms from 31 countries that published sustainability reports during 
2002-2004 and find SRA is a function of company-, industry-, and country-related factors. 
Their study does not consider the association between audit committees and SRA. This is also 
the case with Ruhnke and Gabriel (2013). Their investigation of the largest companies from 
the UK, Germany and Netherlands does not extend to considering the effect of corporate 
governance on sustainability reporting. In a cross-country study covering 26 countries for the 
period 2003-2008 Clarkson et al. (2015b) find that SRA increases the likelihood of firms being 
included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and helps in attracting socially responsible 
investors. Like other cross-country studies, they also do not focus on the role of governance, 
especially of audit committee characteristics, on SRA. 
In a recent study based on interviews with audit committee members, senior 
accountants and internal auditors in Australia, Trotman and Trotman (2015) find audit 
committees are concerned about sustainability related processes and the accuracy of 
sustainability reports. Junior et al. (2014) report that voluntary assurance can enhance the 
credibility of sustainability reports. However, there are different standards for SRA in the UK 
and the assurance provider may be a Big Four firm, an accounting firm, a non-accounting firm 
or a specialist consultant. Assurance providers thus can vary in their background and 
expertise (Smith et al., 2011; Perego and Kolk, 2012) and the plurality of guidance on SRA is 
                                                          
2013); experimental and capital market studies tending to focus on investor perceptions and value relevance of 
sustainability reporting and assurance (Clarkson et al., 2015b; Moroney and Trotman, 2016); qualitative studies 
examining SRA within particular organizational settings including the role of practitioners, management and 
boards of directors and audit committees in the SRA process (Jones and Solomon, 2010; O’Dwyer, 2011; O’Dwyer 
et al., 2011; Trotman and Trotman, 2015). 
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compounded by the fact that assurance providers can use aspects of the various standards on 
an ad hoc 'pick and mix' basis (CorporateRegister.com, 2008, p. 13; see also Smith et al., 2011).7  
 
2.2 Resource dependency theory 
The current study is premised on a theoretical framework based on resource dependency 
theory (RDT) to identify factors that drive an organisation to acquire assurance for 
sustainability reports. Boards of directors play two distinct roles:  monitoring role which has 
been mainly examined following agency theory (Jensen and Mackling, 1979) and service role 
which is the perspective adopted in the RDT to explain the role of the board and its committees 
in achieving sustainability objectives (see for example Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Mallin and 
Michelon, 2011; Ben‐Amar and McIlkenny, 2015; Shaukat et al., 2016; Helfaya and Moussa, 
2017; Jizi, 2017). The service role refers to the ability of the board to bring resources to the firm 
through human capital (experience, expertise, knowledge, and reputation) and relational 
capital (network of ties) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). RDT indicates that board-level human 
vision and strategies are resources in the firm that could be used to create sustainable 
competitive advantages (Hillman et al., 2009; Shaukat et al., 2016; Helfaya and Moussa, 2017). 
Moreover, the composition of the board and its committees could be seen as a unique 
governance mechanism which helps firms to improve their reporting practice and hence their 
sustainable performance (Jizi, 2017).  
                                                          
7 There are two frameworks for assurance services. Under AA1000AS assurance is “an engagement in which an 
assurance provider evaluates and expresses a conclusion on an organization’s public disclosure about its 
performance as well as underlying systems, data and processes against suitable criteria and standards in order to 
increase the credibility of the information for the intended audience’’ (AccountAbility, 2008). The other  standard, 
international standard of assurance engagement ISAE3000 provides more technical explanation in its definition 
(Junior et al., 2014) and notes an assurance is “an engagement in which a practitioner aims to obtain sufficient 
appropriate evidence in order to express a conclusion designed to enhance the degree of confidence of the intended 
users other than the responsible party about the outcome of the measurement or evaluation of an underlying 
subject matter against criteria’’ (The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 2011, p. 19). 
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Boards of directors are responsible for setting firms’ sustainable agenda and allocating 
the necessary resources to ensure business sustainability (Jizi, 2017). They also encourage 
reporting on sustainable development activities to ensure communication with different 
stakeholders (Xie and Hayase, 2007; Rowe et al., 2014; Ben‐Amar and McIlkenny, 2015). 
According to Markarian and Parbonetti (2007, p.1225), the board comprises of directors of 
different expertise and experiences who play distinct roles consistent with their own skills, 
competence, and expertise. This diversity produces a mosaic of decision making structures 
and subsequent firm behaviour. Since the board is subject to workload allocation and 
responsibility distribution having a large board can increase the efficiency in setting 
sustainability agenda (Jizi, 2017). Independent directors can also help attract vital resources 
and assist in directing these resources towards improving firm sustainability strategy and 
sustainability reporting (Helfaya and Moussa, 2017; Jizi, 2017).  
According to RDT, the structure of the board and its committees can act as crucial 
resources to create value and achieve sustainable advantage through providing expertise and 
advice, enhancing legitimacy and firm’s image, developing connections and building external 
relations with important stakeholders, and facilitating access to resources (Galbreath, 2010; 
Ortiz‐de‐Mandojana and Aragon‐Correa, 2015; Shaukat et al., 2016; Ben-Amar et al., 2017; Jizi, 
2017).  Sustainability committees, as part of the corporate governance structure, can be a 
capital resource providing insightful advice to the management about stakeholder 
expectations and aid in the developing of sustainable strategies (Mallin and Michelon, 2011; 
Amran et al., 2014; Shaukat et al., 2016). Also, since sustainability reporting assurance is 
influenced by the firm’s monitoring environment, audit committee contributions could also 
have a direct effect on firms’ sustainability agenda. A well-designed audit committee is likely 
to be more successful in allocating firm’s resources towards acquiring external assurance over 
sustainability reports. Audit committee members’ independence and financial expertise can 
attract human and relational capital, which in turn can improves firm’s sustainability 
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reporting (Helfaya and Moussa, 2017). Therefore, from the perspective of RDT, effective audit 
committees are essential in determining firm’s sustainable strategies. 
 
2.3 Audit committee incremental contribution  
It is widely recognised that boards of directors can affect sustainability reporting and 
performance (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Post et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013; Al-Shaer and 
Zaman, 2016).8 In addition to boards, the existence of sustainability committees, whose 
functions typically include managing the quality of stakeholder engagement process and of 
the sustainability reporting policies of the company, may signal greater monitoring of 
disclosures provided to stakeholders (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Post et al., 2011). Besides 
the board of directors and the existence of sustainability committees, audit committee 
characteristics can also affect the credibility of sustainability reports because they are expected 
to address issues related to controls, risks and sustainability (Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2005; 
Collier and Zaman, 2005; Salleh and Stewart, 2012; FRC, 2015). Since issues related to 
sustainability reporting are voluntary with high level of managerial discretion, it is interesting 
to investigate the incremental contribution of audit committees to the credibility of 
sustainability reports (Al-Shaer et al., 2017).  
Evidence from practice also suggests that sustainability decisions and associated 
reporting are important to audit committee members and there is a growing expectation that 
audit committees and auditors will be accountable for overseeing and assuring non-financial 
                                                          
8 Over time, and partly in response to concerns about social impact of businesses and accountability to 
stakeholders, there has been an increasing emphasis on green governance and boards of directors are expected to 
play greater role in monitoring sustainability performance and reporting (Post et al., 2011). In the UK for instance 
the Companies Act 2006 requires boards of directors to have regard to community and environmental issues when 
considering their duty to promote the success of the company. Oversight of sustainability reporting is also implicit 
in the UK Corporate Governance Code which states that “the board should set the company’s values and standards 
and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and met” (FRC, 2015: A1). Similarly, 
the Turnbull Report (ICAEW, 1999) also advises directors that risk assessment should not be limited to financial 
risk but also those related to health, safety and environmental reputation, and business probity issues. Given the 
emphasis on sustainability reporting and heightened concerns about the social impact of businesses, we expect 
that boards of directors will have a positive association with SRA. 
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reporting information due to the evolution of assurance and control of non-financial 
information. Audit committees, and the boards of directors more broadly, play a role in 
engaging the assurance provider (ICAA, 2014). For example, surveys of institutional investors 
show that sustainability reporting is becoming a core area of audit committee oversight. The 
EY (2014) global survey finds 55.9% of respondents consider it is essential or important that 
audit committees have oversight responsibilities of sustainability reporting while 26% 
consider it is useful.   
 
2.4 Hypothesis development 
Although the role of audit committees in relation to SRA has not been the subject of much 
research, extant evidence on audit committees suggest they are likely to be associated with 
SRA. Audit committees have been found to be associated with improved financial reporting 
and auditing outcomes.9 Audit committees may find SRA provides them reassurance that 
sustainability reporting matters are being managed. They may also perceive that SRA helps 
to protect their reputation. Consequently, they may choose to signal their greater oversight 
over sustainability reporting and prefer to have these reports externally assured. Audit 
committees could provide additional oversight of climate change, sustainability, and energy 
conservation issues, incorporating them into enterprise wide risk assessment, enhancing 
disclosure quality, evaluating the reporting system, and providing assurance of such 
information (EY, 2010). The qualitative features of audit committees, in terms of qualification, 
expertise and diligence can act as resources which are likely to affect their oversight of 
sustainability reporting.  
                                                          
9 These include earning quality (Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008), internal control (Zhang et al., 2007; Goh, 2009; 
Sarens et al., 2013; Abbott et al., 2015; Mat Zain et al., 2015), and reduction in financial reporting fraud (Beasley, 
1996; Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2004) and greater oversight of external and internal auditing (e.g. Turley 
and Zaman, 2007; Bedard and Gendron, 2010; Carcello et al., 2011; Zaman and Sarens, 2013; Martinov-Bennie et 
al., 2015; Trotman and Trotman, 2015). 
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Key audit committee characteristics generally regarded as important for exerting 
influence within companies and affecting outcomes include expertise, independence, 
diligence and size (Turley and Zaman, 2004; Bedard and Gendron, 2010). The expertise of 
audit committee members is likely to influence the extent of monitoring provided over 
sustainability related issues. Audit committee expertise enhances earnings quality (Abbott et 
al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2004; Beasley et al., 2009; Bedard and Gendron, 2010; Erkens and Bonner, 
2012).10 The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that audit committees include 
members with financial literacy and at least one member is a financial expert (FRC, 2015). We 
expect a positive association between audit committee expertise and SRA.  
When audit committees are composed of independent non-executive directors they 
are more likely to be able to exercise more power over management in requiring more 
informative and reliable disclosures (Abbott et al., 2004; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Pomeroy 
and Thornton, 2008; Carcello et al., 2011; Al-Shaer et al., 2017). Lack of audit committee 
independence can impede good corporate governance and may lead to insufficient 
performance due to the fact that such committee will not effectively question the outcome of 
the audit (Klein, 2002; Al-Najjar, 2011).  Also, independent audit committees are expected to 
be able to evaluate objectively internal control and reporting practices, and to question 
management’s actions and policies when necessary (Abbott et al., 2004). We thus expect audit 
committee independence will have a positive association with SRA. 
Previous research has established the importance of active committees for the 
oversight of the financial reporting process. Meeting frequency has been associated with 
higher quality reporting and monitoring (Beasley et al., 2009; Zaman et al., 2011)11. Audit 
                                                          
10 For instance, Abbott et al. (2004) find a negative association between audit committee financial expertise and 
accounting restatements. Zhang et al. (2007) also report a negative association between expertise and material 
weaknesses. 
11 We recognise that activeness is not the same as diligence. The latter however cannot be easily measured using 
publicly available information and thus, consistent with the audit committee literature, we use the number of audit 
committee meetings as an indicator of audit committee activity. Archival studies are not best suited for capturing 
the subjectivities of diligence. Qualitative research approaches are more likely to be fruitful for such an endeavour. 
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committees with three or more members receive more legitimacy and authority and exert 
greater influence over the top management team in monitoring (Abbott et al., 2004). The UK 
Corporate Governance Code recommends that audit committees have at least three members 
(FRC, 2015) as larger audit committees are likely to represent wider interests and member 
contribution to monitoring and improving disclosures.12 We expect active audit committees 
are likely to have a positive association with SRA. 
Although companies may have a sustainability committee, as a subcommittee of the 
board of directors, there may be significant management representation on it. Therefore, the 
existence of internal monitoring mechanisms provided by firm’s core governance structure 
including the existence of independent board members and audit committees, is likely to 
affect voluntary SRA. In examining SRA, we view reporting on sustainability and the 
oversight of risk and corporate governance as being intertwined and inextricably 
interdependent. There are multiple stakeholders with individual risk profiles who can shift 
some of the cost of monitoring to other stakeholders (Knechel and Willekens, 2006, p.1344). 
This can affect the incremental contribution of ACs in enhancing the credibility of 
sustainability reports. Audit committee members and independent board members face risks 
which are different from that of management and to demonstrate their oversight of risks and 
reporting and to protect their reputation against questionable reporting decisions made by 
management they may require more monitoring (Hay et al., 2008; Zaman et al., 2011). 
Consequently, rather than governance mechanisms substituting for one another, there could 
be an overall increase in investment in monitoring (Cohen et al., 2004; Knechel and Willekens, 
2006; Hay et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2014).  
Overall, prior research and policy promulgations suggest audit committees are likely 
to be concerned about sustainability related processes and the accuracy of sustainability 
                                                          
12 Prior literature documents a positive association between audit committee size and the quality of financial 
reporting and auditing (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005; Li et al., 2012). 
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reports. Given the increasing expectations of audit committees and concerns about the 
reliability of (non-financial) reporting and the widening of audit committee remit, we expect 
audit committees (i.e. independent, expert, active and large sized) to have a positive 
association, additional to that of boards of directors and the existence of sustainability 
committees, with SRA.  Our hypothesis is thus: 
H1:   Audit committees have an incremental contribution, i.e. additional to that of 
the boards of directors and the existence of sustainability committees, on sustainability 
reporting assurance. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Regression models 
To test the contribution of ACs on SRA that is incremental to board of directors and when 
sustainability committees exist we use the following model. 
SRA = +1ACSIZE+2ACIND+3ACEXP+4ACMEET+5SUSCOM+ 6BODSIZE 
+7BODIND+8BODMEET+9SIZE+10LEV+11ROA+12IND+ℇit 
 
where: 
SRA=  if sustainability report is externally assured=1, 0 otherwise 
ACSIZE=  number of audit committee members 
ACIND= proportion of audit committee members who are independent 
ACEXP= proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise 
ACMEET= number of audit committee meetings held during the year 
SUSCOM= if a sustainability committee exists =1, otherwise 0 
BODSIZE= number of directors on the board  
BODIND= proportion of independent directors on the board 
BODMEET= number of board meetings held during the year 
SIZE= natural log of total assets 
ROA= return on asset 
LEV= total debt to total asset 
IND= industry dummy variable 
ℇ= error term 
 
3.2 Data and variables 
We examine the contribution of audit committees to the credibility of sustainability reporting 
using a sample of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Consistent with our 
research question on the incremental contribution of audit committees, additional to that of 
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board of directors and the existence of sustainability committees, in examining SRA we 
include audit committee characteristics as well variables relating to boards of directors and 
the existence of sustainability committees. Our dependent variable reflects the propensity of 
sustainability reporting assurance (SRA) measured using a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
sustainability reports are externally assured and 0 otherwise. Audit committee characteristics 
in our model include number of audit committee members (ACSIZE), proportion of audit 
committee members who are independent directors (ACIND), proportion of audit committee 
members with financial expertise (ACEXP) and number of audit committee meetings held 
during the year (ACMEET). We use SUSCOM a dummy variable equal to 1 if a sustainability 
committee exists and 0 otherwise.13  
Following the literature, we include board size (BODSIZE) measured by total number 
of directors serving on the board. Larger boards tend to have members from diverse 
backgrounds and experiences and may reflect greater commitment to strategic activities (Lim 
et al., 2007; De Villiers et al., 2011). Boards with greater proportion of independent directors 
may provide more monitoring over management to build corporate reputation and trust 
(Beasley, 1996). We define board independence (BODIND) as the proportion of independent 
directors to the total number of directors on the board. One of the main duties of the board is 
to hold meetings that enable oversight of financial information and increase the effectiveness 
of board decisions and improve transparency and quality of disclosures (Carcello et al., 2011). 
We control for board activity using the total number of board meetings held during the year 
(BODMEET).14  
                                                          
13 We identified the existence of SUSCOM through a review of sustainability and/or annual report. Companies 
vary in the specific title they assign to the board subcommittee dealing with sustainability issues, e.g. 
environmental committee, corporate social responsibility committee. We took this variation in the label into 
consideration in our coding. 
14 Unlike in the US, CEO duality is increasingly rare in the UK. We considered including CEO duality in our model 
but dropped it due to lack of statistical variation across firms.  
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Prior literature suggests that it is important to control for firm characteristics when 
examining sustainability reporting (see Simnett et al., 2009a; Rodrigue et al., 2013). We include 
firm size (SIZE) measured by the natural log of total assets, leverage (LEV) measured by total 
debt to total asset ratio, profitability of the firm measured by return on asset (ROA), and 
industry classification (IND) using the DataStream Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
level 1 industries (ten groups).  
Our initial sample includes all the companies listed in 2012 in the UK FTSE350. 
Elimination of firms with missing data reduces the sample size to 333 firms. The Global 
Reporting Initiative database is the main source for our dependent variable. We 
supplemented this with information from the 2012 annual reports of the sample firms. For 
corporate governance data we relied on the 2012 annual reports and obtained financial data 
from DataStream. For additional analysis, we divide our sample into subsample groups based 
on industry (non-financial industry and sustainability sensitive industries) and size (large vs. 
small) for sensitivity testing. 
 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for key variables in our model. Panel A shows the means 
for all firms, whereas Panel B shows the means by industry. In Panel C we report the means 
for firms with and without SRA and for firms with and without a sustainability committee. 
We also report the t-test for differences in the means between the two subsamples. Panel A 
shows that the mean for our dependent variable SRA is 0.174. With regards to audit committee 
variables, we find the mean audit committee size (ACSIZE) is 3.922 indicating that audit 
committees in our sample firms have on average four members. The mean for audit committee 
independence (ACIND) is 0.781 and indicates compliance with the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (FRC, 2015) is high. The mean for audit committee expertise (ACEXP) is 0.258 and the 
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mean for audit committee meetings (ACMEET) is 4.158 and indicates that audit committees 
in our sample meet on average four times a year. SUSCOM has a mean of 0.360 and suggests 
that over a third of our sample firms have a separate sustainability committee. 
We find the mean board size (BODSIZE) is 9.336 and board independence (BODIND) 
is 0.51 which means that half of the board members are independent. The mean number of 
board meetings is 8.187. Regarding firm-specific control variables, we find the mean firm size 
(SIZE) is £1,149,379,000, return on assets (ROA) is 0.079 and leverage (LEV) is 0.189. When we 
consider the means for the variables in our models based on industry (Panel B) we find that 
the basic materials industry has the highest mean for SRA (i.e. 0.48) indicating almost half the 
companies in this sector have their sustainability report externally assured. We also find that 
the consumer goods industry has the highest mean of 0.625 for SUSCOM, i.e. existence of a 
sustainability committee, whereas the financials industry has the lowest SUSCOM mean of 
0.21 and the lowest SRA mean of 0.09.  
In Panel C we report the means and t-tests for companies that have SRA and those that 
do not (SRA=1/0) and for firms with a sustainability committee and those without 
(SUSCOM=1/0). We find in the subsample of firms that have their sustainability reports 
externally assured, audit committees are larger, more independent, have more financial 
experts, and are more active. The boards of directors of assured firms, i.e. those with SRA, are 
also larger, more active and more independent compared to those without SRA. Compared to 
firms that do not have a sustainability committee, we find the subsample of firms with 
SUSCOM has audit committees that are more independent and more active and have more 
financial experts. The boards of directors of firms with sustainability committees are also 
larger and more active compared with firms that do not have a sustainability committee.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
17 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for variables used in our analysis. We find that 
SRA has a significant and positive association with ACMEET, BODSIZE and LEV. SUSCOM 
is significant and positively associated with ACEXP, ACMEET, BODSIZE, BODMEET and 
LEV.15  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2 Multivariate results 
Consistent with our earlier discussion on the association between audit committee and SRA 
we report the findings of our regression tests in this section. Sustainability reporting assurance 
(SRA) is a dichotomous variable and thus we use logistic regression. Table 3 tests the effect of 
audit committee on SRA. Model 3.1 tests the impact of board characteristics, the presence of 
sustainability committees and firm-specific control variables on SRA, and Model 3.2 tests the 
contribution of audit committee, incremental to that of the board of directors and the existence 
of sustainability committee. Model 3.2 shows that both audit committee independence 
(ACIND) and audit committee expertise (ACEXP) have a positive and significant association 
with SRA (p < 0.01). Also, audit committee meeting (ACMEET) has a positive and significant 
association at p<0.05 with SRA. Audit committee size is also positive though not significant. 
We find the presence of sustainability committee (SUSCOM) has a negative and significant 
impact on SRA at p<0.10 (Model 3.1) and p<0.01 (Model 3.2). Additionally, board size 
(BODSIZE) has a positive and significant association at p<0.01 with SRA (Models 3.1 and 3.2). 
Of firm-specific control variables, we find leverage (LEV) has a significant and positive 
association at p<0.01 with SRA (Model 3.1 and 3.2) and suggests that leveraged firms are more 
                                                          
15 We do not find any correlation above 0.5 among the variables which suggests multicollinearity is not an issue. 
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likely to have their sustainability reports externally assured. The inclusion of audit committee 
variables in Model 3.2 also improves the model fit (Pseudo R2 improves from 0.147 to 0.225).  
Overall, our findings provide support for our hypothesis that audit committees have 
a contribution incremental to that of the boards of directors and sustainability committees on 
SRA consistent with the RDT argument that through providing expertise, advice, and 
vigilance board committees can act as crucial resources for creating value and achieving 
sustainable advantage (Galbreath, 2010; Ortiz‐de‐Mandojana and Aragon‐Correa, 2015; 
Shaukat et al., 2016). Our results show that in the UK where the current SRA practice has been 
criticised as lacking credibility and having different standards and assurance providers, and 
concerns have been expressed about the degree of managerial control, it appears that the 
qualitative characteristics of audit committees, i.e. expertise, independence, and meetings, 
affect the voluntary assurance of sustainability reporting. 
From a RDT perspective, the demand for assurance may place an increased drain on 
resource use when there is insufficient market for resources. This is more likely to pertain to 
small firms and explain the negative impact of SUSCOM on SRA we observed earlier. To 
explore this further, we split our sample into small and large firms based on median size 
(Models 3.3 and 3.4 respectively). We find in large firms audit committee independence and 
meetings have a positive and significant association with SRA at p<0.05 and audit committee 
expertise is positive and significant at p<0.10 with SRA (Model 3.4). Additionally, in large 
firms SUSCOM is not significant but it has a positive association with SRA. In small firms 
(Model 3.3) we find ACIND and ACMEET have a positive and significant association at 
p<0.05 with SRA but SUSCOM has a negative and significant association at p<0.01. It may be 
the case that sustainability committees are sufficient for providing oversight of sustainability 
reporting in small firms and hence the negative association between SUSCOM and SRA. 
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Additionally, small firms may perceive that the incremental cost of external assurance 
outweighs the benefit.16  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
To further explore the incremental effect of ACs, in Table 4 we introduce interaction variables 
by combining SUSCOM with each audit committee variable. Model 4.1 uses the full sample, 
Model 4.2 uses small firms extracted from the full sample whereas Model 4.3 is based on large 
firms. Our results show that the interactions of SUSCOM with ACIND is positive and 
significant at p<0.05 for the full sample and for small firms, and the interaction of ACEXP and 
SUSCOM is positive and significant at p<0.10 for the full sample and at p<0.05 for small firms 
subsample.17 The individual impact of SUSCOM in the model remains negative and 
significant for the full sample and for small firms subsample and positive and insignificant 
for large firms subsample. Consistent with our previous findings, the individual impact of 
ACIND and ACMEET remains positive and significant for the full sample and both the large 
and small firms subsamples.18 Overall, after we include board of directors and sustainability 
committee existence in the regression test, we find a positive and significant impact of audit 
committee variables (independence, expertise, and meeting) on SRA which indicates ACs 
have an incremental contribution and add credibility to sustainability reports. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
                                                          
16 Jones and Solomon (2010) note from interview evidence that small firms may consider internal assurance 
provided by sustainability committees is sufficient. 
17 The model we use to test this is: SRA=+1ACSIZE +2ACIND+3ACEXP+4ACMEET+5SUSCOM 
+6SUSCOM*ACSIZE+7SUSCOM*ACIND+8SUSCOM*ACEXP+9SUSCOM*ACMEET+10BODSIZE+11BODI
ND + 12BODMEET +13SIZE  +14LEV +15ROA +16IND+ℇ it 
18 We acknowledge that high correlation among interaction term and its two components is inevitable. To reduce 
the VIF values, we subtract the mean from continuous components (mean centering) before creating the product 
variable. Please refer to the Stata discussion forums for further insight. 
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4.3 Additional analysis: industry effects  
We further explore industry influence on the impact of ACs on SRA by testing both non-
financial firms sample and sustainability-sensitive industry firms sample. Firms in the 
financial industry exhibit distinct corporate governance and financial characteristics. Since 
these firms make up almost one third of our sample, in Table 5 we provide results of 
additional analysis for non-financial firms. We follow our previous approach and first 
examine the effect of boards of directors and the existence of sustainability committees and 
other controls (Model 5.1) and then we add audit committee variables in Model 5.2 to examine 
if audit committees have an incremental contribution, additional to that of the boards and 
SUSCOM, on SRA for firms from the non-financial industry. Our result shows that ACIND is 
positive and significant at p<0.05, ACMEET and BODSIZE are positive and significant at 
p<0.01 while SUSCOM is negative and significant at p<0.01 with SRA. This is consistent with 
our previous findings in terms of significance and the direction of associations. The Pseudo 
R2 increases from 0.135 in Model 5.1 to 0.222 when we add audit committee variables in Model 
5.2.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
We also provide an additional analysis for sustainability sensitive industries. We include 
industry as a categorical variable following Sierra et al. (2013) and assign a value of 0-5 based 
on firms’ sustainability-sensitive activities. We assign a value of 0 if the company belongs to 
financial services industry, a value of 1 if the company belongs to technology and 
telecommunication industry, a value of 2 if the company belongs to consumer services and 
health care industry, a value of 3 if the company belongs to consumer goods industry, a value 
of 4 if the company belongs to basic materials, utilities and construction industry, and a value 
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of 5 if the company belongs to oil and gas industry.19 Our findings in Models 5.3 and 5.4 are 
consistent with our previous findings in Models 5.1 and 5.2 and show that ACIND, ACMEET, 
and BODSIZE have a positive and significant association SRA while SUSCOM has a negative 
and significant association with SRA. Overall, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the 
view that audit committees have an incremental contribution on SRA and support the premise 
of RDT that effective audit committees can act as a vital resource in determining  a firm’s 
sustainability strategy.20 
 
4.4 Additional analysis: assurer and standard choice  
As an additional test we provide exploratory evidence on the association between AC 
contribution and both SRA type and choice of SRA standard. Prior literature argues that 
assurance service is perceived to be of a higher quality when the provider is a top tier 
accountancy firm (Junior et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2012; Hodge et al., 2009; Farooq and de 
Villiers, 2017). We extract the sample of companies that have their sustainability reports 
assured and investigate the assurer type and assurance standard applied in SRA. For 
assurance type (SRAType) we use a coding scale based on the type of the external assurer. 
Prior research suggests that assurance provider type can affect investor perceptions (Pflugrath 
et al., 2011; Green and Taylor, 2013; Ferguson and Pundrich, 2015). We assign a score of 1 if 
sustainability reports are externally assured by a non-accounting firm, 2 if the report is 
                                                          
19 We have 18 companies out of 333 (5.37%) belong to Oil and Gas; 102 companies out of 333 (30.45%) belong to 
Basic Materials, Utilities, and Construction; 24 companies (7.16) out of 333 belong to Consumer Goods; 65 
companies (19.4%) out of 333 belong to Consumer Services and Health Care; 24 companies (7.16%) out of 333 
belong to Technology and Telecommunication; and 100 companies (30.03%) out of 333 belong to Financial Services. 
20 We also acknowledge that our current regression design does not sufficiently address the potential endogeneity 
concern where it is likely that both audit committee (and board of directors) characteristics and the decision to 
acquire external assurance are mutually dependent on unobserved but relevant factors. To mitigate this, we adjust 
our research design by applying a matching approach which requires finding potential determinants of a firm’s 
decision to acquire external assurance, we chose company size and industry. We investigate the association 
between audit committees and SRA using a matched-pair sample of SRA and non-SRA firms based on size and 
industry. Our tests results (untabulated) remain qualitatively similar and show that audit committees have an 
incremental role, i.e. additional to that of the boards and SUSCOM, on sustainability assurance (SRA). 
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externally assured by a non-Big Four accounting firm, and 3 if the external assurer is a Big 
Four firm.21  
Regarding the choice of assurance standard (SRAStd), AA1000AS and ISAE3000 are 
the most commonly used standards for providing assurance on sustainability reporting. 
AA1000AS is a generic standard designed specifically for sustainability assurance whereas 
ISAE3000 is used on all non-financial assurance engagement (Lansen-Rogers and 
Oelschlaegel, 2005; Simnett, 2012; Mock et al., 2013). The two approaches are complementary 
and compatible hence we expect the existence of both will enhance the quality of sustainability 
reporting assurance (Junior et al., 2014).22 We rely on a coding scale based on the adopted 
assurance approach and assign a score of 0 if sustainability reports are assured but no 
assurance standard is specified, 1 if either AA1000AS or ISAE3000 is used, and 2 if both 
standards are used for SRA.23  
 
 [Table 6 about here] 
  
Table 6 reports the regression results when we use SRAType as the dependent variable 
(Models 6.1 and 6.2) and SRAStd as the dependent variable (Models 6.3 and 6.4). The results 
in Table 6 are based on the reduced sample of firms that have their sustainability reports 
externally assured. Both for SRAType and SRAStd, which we measure using a coding scale, 
we use ordered-Probit specification for the regression tests. When we use assurer type 
(SRAType) as the dependent, our results show that ACIND is positive and significant at 
p<0.01 (Models 6.2) and BODSIZE is positive and significant at p<0.05 (Model 6.1 and 6.2). 
                                                          
21 We find 9 (15%) companies obtain external assurance from non-accounting firms, 20 (33%) companies obtain 
external assurance from non-Big Four accounting firms, and 31 (52%) companies obtain external assurance from 
Big Four firms. 
22 AccountAbility (2008) states that where necessary AA1000AS can be used together with ISAE3000. 
23 We find 24 (40%) firms do not make a reference to any assurance standard, 31 (52%) follow either AA1000AS or 
ISAE3000 standard, and 5 (8%) use both AA1000AS and ISAE3000. 
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Consistent with our earlier findings, SUSCOM is negative and significant at p<0.05 (Model 
6.1 and 6.2). When we use assurance standard (SRAStd) as the dependent, we find ACEXP is 
positive and significant at p<0.01 and ACMEET is positive and significant at p<0.01 with SRA 
(Model 6.4). BODSIZE is positive and significant at p<0.05 (Model 6.3) and SUSCOM is 
negative but insignificant (Models 6.3 and 6.4). Overall the results in Table 6 remain 
qualitatively similar and provide evidence of audit committees having an incremental effect, 
additional to that of the boards of directors and sustainability committees, on assurance type 
and standard.  
Our results show that audit committees composed of independent members are 
associated with use of a Big 4 audit firm for SRA. Also, our results show that in the UK where 
there is no single benchmark against which sustainability reporting can be assessed, it appears 
that audit committees with expertise, independence and diligence are more likely to mitigate 
concerns about the ad hoc ‘pick and mix’ (O'Dwyer and Owen, 2005; Smith et al., 2011; Perego 
and Kolk, 2012) in SRA and to improve the oversight of the SRA process.  
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Recognising calls for more research on sustainability assurance and governance (Cohen and 
Simnett, 2015; Peters and Romi, 2015; Trotman and Trotman, 2015; Farooq and de Villiers, 
2017), this paper addresses the impact of audit committees on voluntary SRA. Specifically, we 
test whether audit committees have a contribution additional to that of the boards of directors 
and the existence of sustainability committees on sustainability reporting assurance. Using a 
sample of companies listed in the UK FTSE350 in 2012, we find support for our hypothesis 
which indicates that they add credibility to sustainability reporting.  
Our paper has a few limitations. The findings are restricted to UK FTSE350 companies 
in 2012 therefore a longitudinal study examining audit committee effects on SRA over time 
and in the context of specific corporate governance reforms would be useful. Future research 
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can also supplement our study by conducting interviews with audit committee members and 
provide insights into the role of audit committees relating to SRA within particular 
organizational and institutional settings. Also, comparative studies focusing on different legal 
jurisdictions have the potential to shed more light on the effect of institutional and legal 
environment on SRA. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that further research examining the 
interaction between and roles of different agents involved in sustainability issues (Arena et 
al., 2018), in particular between audit committees, internal auditors, external auditors and 
management (Zaman and Sarens, 2013; Trotman and Trotman, 2015), and the consequences 
of the interaction and interdependencies between them on accountability to stakeholders is 
likely to be fruitful.  
Our paper is likely to be of interest to regulators and practitioners. Recognising 
stakeholder and regulatory concerns about reliability of non-financial information and calls 
for audit committees to take on a wider remit, we explore the association between audit 
committees and SRA. A key contribution of our paper to the literature is showing that audit 
committees have an incremental contribution, i.e. additional to that of board of directors and 
the existence of sustainability committees, on SRA. Our findings suggest that rather than 
substituting for governance mechanisms audit committees play a complementary role and 
add credibility to sustainability reporting.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: All firms N SRA ACSIZE ACIND ACEXP ACMEET SUSCOM BODSIZE BODIND BODMEET SIZE ROA LEV 
Mean 333 0.174 3.922 0.781 0.258 4.158 0.36 9.336 0.51 8.187 1,149,379 0.079 0.189 
Median  333 0 4 1 0.25 4 0 9 0.571 8 320,636.50 0.071 0.153 
Std.Dev  333 0.379 0.975 0.076 0.212 1.715 0.48 2.656 0.275 2.723 4,737,005 0.124 0.168 
Skewness 333 1.718 0.484 -4.168 0.397 1.717 0.581 0.533 -0.7 0.957 -0.941 -0.191 0.835 
Kurtosis 333 3.952 3.761 19.123 2.532 7.238 1.338 3.069 2.706 4.529 3.816 4.304 3.161 
Maximum  333 1 7 1 1 15 1 21 1 20 81,300,000 1.75 0.912 
Minimum  333 0 2 0 0 1 0 4 0 2 100,000 -0.325 0 
Panel B: Means: Industry 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Oil & Gas 18 0.333 3.833 1 0.194 4.222 0.277 10.438 0.531 8.125 26,835,110 0.076 0.14 
Basic Materials  29 0.482 3.655 0.991 0.209 4.172 0.482 10.125 0.562 7.75 18,543,880 0.052 0.224 
Industrials  66 0.166 3.954 0.911 0.301 4.015 0.424 9.279 0.508 9.016 2,619,386 0.098 0.2 
Consumer Goods 24 0.166 3.666 0.971 0.322 3.916 0.625 9.565 0.476 8.304 8,373,834 0.095 0.191 
Health Care 8 0.125 4.25 1 0.236 4.875 0.5 10.625 0.568 9.75 10,224,953 0.096 0.249 
Consumer Svs  57 0.123 3.824 0.964 0.296 4 0.315 9.545 0.463 8.364 3,913,217 0.113 0.226 
Telecom 9 0.222 3.888 1 0.413 4.111 0.555 9.833 0.418 8 21,363,163 0.045 0.356 
Utilities  7 0.286 4 1 0.257 4.428 0.571 10.143 0.541 8.286 16,120,271 0.057 0.418 
Financials  100 0.009 4.107 0.978 0.21 4.264 0.21 8.902 0.565 7.451 64,723,160 0.047 0.157 
Technology  15 0.133 3.733 0.951 0.243 4.466 0.4 7.909 0.427 9.091 793,397 0.083 0.082 
Panel C: Means: Subsample 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
SRA=1  60  -  4.052  0.997  0.315  4.707  0.310  10.517  0.539  8.448  11.293  0.060  0.242 
SRA=0  273  -  3.905  0.982  0.242  4.047  0.371  9.097  0.501  8.151  11.241 0.077  0.177 
t-test    - -1.055  -1.629  -2.465***  -2.810***  0.871  -3.835***  -0.948  -0.774  -0.121  1.513  -2.806*** 
Mann-Whitney value  - -1.249 -1.467 -2.022** -3.007*** 0.872 -3.593*** -1.212 -0.787 0.119 1.856 -3.485*** 
SUSCOM=1  120  0.150  3.925  0.991  0.289  4.550  -  10.025  0.498  8.622  11.175  0.073  0.223 
 SUSCOM=0  213  0.187  3.934  0.981  0.238  3.962  -  8.946  0.512  7.971  11.283  0.076  0.168 
t-test    0.871  0.085  -1.503*  -2.155**  -2.964***  -  -3.725***  0.467  -2.165**  0.277  0.084  -2.985*** 
Mann-Whitney value  0.872 0.410 -1.417 -1.956* -2.631*** - -4.134*** -0.061 -2.701*** 0.222 0.957 -2.998*** 
Notes: SRA=if sustainability report is externally assured=1, 0 otherwise; ACSIZE=number of audit committee members; ACIND=proportion of audit committee members who are independent; ACEXP=proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise; 
ACMEET= number of audit committee meetings held during the year; SUSCOM= if a sustainability committee exists =1, otherwise 0; BODSIZE=number of directors on the board; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on the board; BODMEET= number 
of board meetings held during the year; SIZE= total assets (‘000 GBP); ROA= return on asset; LEV=total debt to total asset; IND= industry dummy variable. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
  SRA ACSIZE ACIND ACEXP ACMEET SUSCOM BODSIZE BODIND BODMEET SIZE ROA LEV 
SRA 1.000                      
ACSIZE 0.084 1.000                    
ACIND 0.085 -0.007 1.000                  
ACEXP 0.083 -0.053 -0.037 1.000                
ACMEET 0.158*** 0.116** -0.005 0.153*** 1.000              
SUSCOM -0.054 -0.039 0.080 0.119** 0.142** 1.000       
BODSIZE 0.202*** 0.207*** -0.004 0.121** 0.321*** 0.224*** 1.000           
BODIND 0.066 0.123** 0.030 0.002 0.120** -0.017 0.082 1.000         
BODMEET 0.047 0.029 0.000 0.135*** 0.168*** 0.161** 0.166**** -0.018 1.000       
SIZE -0.036 -0.02 0.121** -0.054 -0.044 -0.015 -0.237*** -0.079 -0.019 1.000     
ROA -0.105* -0.103* 0.057 0.133** -0.036 -0.051 -0.098 -0.074 0.01 -0.193*** 1.000   
LEV 0.176** 0.066 0.059 0.101 -0.013 0.172*** 0.106* 0.011 0.056 0.043 -0.106* 1.000 
 
Spearman two tailed, *,**,***= 0.1,0.05, 0.01 level 
Notes: SRA=if sustainability report is externally assured=1, 0 otherwise; ACSIZE=number of audit committee members; ACIND=proportion of audit committee 
members who are independent; ACEXP=proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise; ACMEET= number of audit committee meetings 
held during the year; SUSCOM= if a sustainability committee exists =1, otherwise 0; BODSIZE=number of directors on the board; BODIND= proportion of 
independent directors on the board; BODMEET= number of board meetings held during the year; SIZE= natural log of total assets; ROA= return on asset; 
LEV=total debt to total asset; IND= industry dummy variable. 
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Table 3: ACs and Credibility of Sustainability Reports 
 
DV=SRA All firms Small firms Large firms 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 
ACSIZE  0.137 0.455 -0.031 
ACIND  8.157*** 4.742** 0.689** 
ACEXP  1.432* 0.057 0.249* 
ACMEET  0.251** 0.452** 0.325** 
SUSCOM -0.758* -1.142*** -2.328*** 0.356 
BODSIZE 1.257*** 0.214*** 0.244* 1.03 
BODIND 1.471 -0.158 -3.2 0.646 
BODMEET 1.02 0.009 0.113 -0.033 
SIZE 1.037 0.026 0.214* 0.025 
ROA 0.191 -3.834 0.76 -8.565** 
LEV 8.320*** 2.689*** 1.682 3.072** 
IND Included  Included Included Included 
_cons -4.829*** -17.854*** -20.627*** 19.151** 
Pseudo R2 0.147 0.225 0.346 0.284 
Wald Chi2 40.60 49.15 37.40 33.85 
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Average VIF 3.53 2.97 2.62 4.98 
 
*,**,***= 0.1,0.05, 0.01 level 
Notes: SRA=if sustainability report is externally assured=1, 0 otherwise; ACSIZE=number of audit 
committee members; ACIND=proportion of audit committee members who are independent; 
ACEXP=proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise; ACMEET= number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year; SUSCOM= if a sustainability committee exists =1, otherwise 
0; BODSIZE=number of directors on the board; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on the 
board; BODMEET= number of board meetings held during the year; SIZE= natural log of total assets; 
ROA= return on asset; LEV=total debt to total asset; IND= industry dummy variable. 
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Table 4: Credibility of Sustainability Reports: interaction effects 
DV=SRA Full Sample Small firms Large firms  
 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 
ACSIZE* SUSCOM -0.247 -0.458 1.851 
ACIND* SUSCOM 5.649** 6.446** 0.002 
ACEXP* SUSCOM 3.333* 4.563** 5.540 
ACMEET* SUSCOM -0.205 -0.231 2.631 
ACSIZE 0.248 0.379 0.835 
ACIND 9.376** 10.970** 0.034 
ACEXP 0.051 0.252 0.650 
ACMEET 0.355** 0.407* 1.776** 
SUSCOM -5.873*** -6.790*** 0.031 
BODSIZE 0.229*** 0.320*** 1.032 
BODIND -0.177 -1.878 1.489 
BODMEET 0.015 0.088 0.864 
SIZE 0.011 -0.067 0.616 
ROA -3.783 -0.586 0.042 
LEV 2.694*** 3.343** 8.616 
IND Included  Included  Included  
Pseudo R2 0.242 0.337 0.303 
Wald Chi2 472.93 507.03 30.82 
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Average VIF 1.43 1.51 1.64 
 
*,**,***= 0.1,0.05, 0.01 level 
Notes: SRA=if sustainability report is externally assured=1, 0 otherwise; ACSIZE=number of audit 
committee members; ACIND=proportion of audit committee members who are independent; 
ACEXP=proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise; ACMEET= number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year; SUSCOM= if a sustainability committee exists =1, otherwise 
0; BODSIZE=number of directors on the board; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on the 
board; BODMEET= number of board meetings held during the year; SIZE= natural log of total assets; 
ROA= return on asset; LEV=total debt to total asset; IND= industry dummy variable. 
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Table 5: Additional Analysis: Industry Effects 
 
DV= SRA Non-Financial Firms Sample 
 
Sustainability Sensitive Industries’ 
sample  Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 
ACSIZE    0.151  0.025 
ACIND   12.328**  5.257*** 
ACEXP   0.388  0.906 
ACMEET   0.314***  0.245*** 
SUSCOM -1.232*** -1.399*** -0.855** -1.061*** 
BODSIZE 0.223*** 0.246*** 0.231*** 0.221*** 
BODIND 0.325 -0.302 0.501 0.064 
BODMEET 0.022 0.025 0.001 -0.003 
SIZE 0.041 0.051 0.03 0.021 
ROA -0.915 -1.136 -3.881* -4.564* 
LEV 2.449** 3.122** 1.891** 2.232** 
Non-financial industries  Included  Included    
Sustainability-sensitive 
industries  
  Included  Included  
_con  -4.362*** -18.276*** -3.853*** -14.715*** 
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.222 0.122 0.182 
Wald Chi2 30.38 42.25 35.01 44.98 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Average VIF 1.09 1.13 1.96 1.75 
 
*,**,***= 0.1,0.05, 0.01 level 
Notes: SRA=if sustainability report is externally assured=1, 0 otherwise; ACSIZE=number of audit 
committee members; ACIND=proportion of audit committee members who are independent; 
ACEXP=proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise; ACMEET= number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year; SUSCOM= if a sustainability committee exists =1, otherwise 
0; BODSIZE=number of directors on the board; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on the 
board; BODMEET= number of board meetings held during the year; SIZE= natural log of total assets; 
ROA= return on asset; LEV=total debt to total asset; IND= industry dummy variable. 
  
35 
 
Table 6: Additional Analysis: SRA Type and Standard 
 
DV SRAType SRAStd 
 Model 6.1 Model 6.2 Model 6.3 Model 6.4 
ACSIZE   -0.470   -0.117 
ACIND   5.997***   3.317 
ACEXP   0.217   0.770*** 
ACMEET   0.018   0.277** 
SUSCOM -1.218** -2.259*** -0.037 -0.042 
BODSIZE 0.077* 0.244** 0.215** 0.117 
BODIND 0.148 -1.761* 0.713 0.916 
BODMEET 0.044 0.025 -0.235* -0.294* 
SIZE 0.047 0.157** 0.101 -0.199** 
ROA -0.561 -3.709 -0.784 -5.560* 
LEV -0.104 -4.896* -0.767 -1.023 
IND Included  Included  Included  Included  
Pseudo R2 0.205 0.372 0.251 0.433 
LR Chi2 23.66 39.12 25.46 39.87 
Prob> Chi2 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Average VIF  1.78 2.26 1.78 2.26 
 
*,**,***= 0.1,0.05, 0.01 level 
Notes: SRAType= 1 if sustainability report is assured by a non-accounting firm, 2 if  assured a non-Big 
Four accounting firm, and 3 if assurer is a Big Four firm; SRAStd=0 if sustainability reports are assured 
but no assurance standard is specified, 1 if either AA1000AS or ISAE3000 is used, and 2 if both 
standards are used for SRA; ACSIZE=number of audit committee members; ACIND=proportion of 
audit committee members who are independent; ACEXP=proportion of audit committee members 
with financial expertise; ACMEET= number of audit committee meetings held during the year; 
SUSCOM= if a sustainability committee exists =1, otherwise 0; BODSIZE=number of directors on the 
board; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on the board; BODMEET= number of board 
meetings held during the year; SIZE= natural log of total assets; ROA= return on asset; LEV=total debt 
to total asset; IND= industry dummy variable. 
 
 
 
 
